Abstract: To achieve security in the networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages sent between the users. Keys for encryption and authentication purposes must be agreed upon by the users in the networks. Three new pairwise key agreement protocols based on Weil pairing are proposed in this paper. In those protocols, all the users share common secret information. They may arrange the pairwise key and authenticate each other by fewer messages. The proposed protocols have the security attributes such as known session key security, perfect forward secrecy, no key-compromise impersonation, no unknown key-share and no key control.
As the first practical solution to key agreement problem, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [1] enables two parties, never having met in advance or shared keying material, to establish a shared secret by exchanging
messages over an open channel. The security of this protocol is based on the assumption of the difficulty of the discrete logarithm arithmetic and the Diffie-Hellman Decision problem.
It is generally desired that each party in a key establishment protocol be able to determine the true identity of the others which could possibly gain access to the resulting key, implying preclusion of any unauthorized additional parties from deducing the same key. However, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol does not authenticate the two communication parties, hence suffers from the "man-in-the-middle" attack. Key authentication is the property whereby one party is assured that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party may gain access to a particular secret key. The goal of any authenticated key establishment protocol is to establish keying data. Ideally, the established key should have precisely the same attributes as a key established face-to-face. However, it is not an easy task to identify the precise security requirements of authenticated key establishment.
A secure key agreement protocol is desired to have the following attributes [1, 2] :
• Known-Key security: The protocol should still achieve its goal in the face of an adversary who has learned some other session keys unique secret keys which each run of a key agreement protocol between A and B should produce.
• Forward secrecy: If the long-term keys or the secret key of some parties are compromised, the secrecy of past session keys are not compromised.
• Key-Compromise impersonation: When A's private key is compromised, it may be desirable that this event does not enable an adversary to impersonate other entities to A.
• Unknown key-share: Entity B cannot be coerced into sharing a key with entity A without B's knowledge.
• No key control: The secret session key between any two users is determined by both users taking part in, and none of the two users can influence the outcome of the secret session key, or enforce the session key to fall into a pre-determined interval.
In this paper, we propose three new pairwise key agreement protocols which are based on Weil pairing. The protocols have the attributes such as known session key security, perfect forward secrecy, no key-compromise impersonation, no unknown key-share and no key control. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 gives the properties of Weil pairing and reviews some key agreement protocols; Section 3 presents our pairwise key agreement protocols which are based on Weil pairing; Section 4 gives the performance and the security analysis of our protocols; Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
Related Work
In this section, we briefly describe the basic definition and properties of the Weil pairing, and then review the research on key agreement protocols.
Weil pairing
Let E be an elliptic curve over a base field F. Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P whose odder is a prime q, and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both G 1 and G 2 are hard. The Weil pairing [3−5] is defined by a bilinear map e: G BDH Assumption: We assume that the BDH problem is hard, which means that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the BDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Key agreement protocol
Diffie-Hellman key agreement is a fundamental technique providing unauthenticated key agreement. After Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is put forward, lots of key agreement protocols are proposed [1] , such as Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol [6] , JV multi-party key agreement protocol [7] , two pass authenticated key agreement protocol [2] , MTI/A0 key agreement protocol [8] , tripartite key agreement protocol [9] , ID-based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol [5] , etc.
The Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol is designed by Bellovin and Merritt [6] . It provides security and authentication on computer networks, using both symmetric and public-key cryptography in a novel way: A shared secret key is used to encrypt a randomly generated public key. This protocol is secure against active attacks, and has the property that the password is protected against off-line "dictionary" attacks. A multi-party key agreement protocol is provided by Just and Vaudenay [7] . The protocols provide key authentication, key confirmation and forward secrecy. Three two-pass authenticated key agreement protocols are proposed by Song and Kim [2] . One of these protocols is presented in asymmetric setting, which is based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement working over an elliptic curve group, and the other two protocols are modifications of this protocol. The MTI/A0 key agreement protocol is presented by Matsumoto et al. in 1986 [8] . It is designed to provide implicit key authentication. The security of this protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in elliptic curve group. In 2000, Joux shows how to implement an elegant tripartite key agreement protocol using pairing [9] : Only one broadcast is required for each party. This protocol has found very good applications to broadcast network. However, just like the Diffie-Hellman protocol, Joux's protocol does not attempt to authenticate the three communicating parties, and is vulnerable to "man-in-the-middle" attacks. Smart describes an ID-based authenticated two-pass key agreement protocol which makes use of the Weil pairing [5] . The protocol requires a trusted key generation center, and has a property that the key generation center is able to recover the agreed session keys from the message flows and its secret key.
Key Agreement Protocols Based on Weil pairing
This section describes the pairwise key agreement protocols which is based on Weil pairing. The security of these protocols is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem in elliptic curve group. All protocols in this paper have been described in the setting of the group of the points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field.
Let E be an elliptic curve over a base field F and G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P in E(F) whose odder is a prime q. Let 
Protocol 1
We assume that all the members in the networks have a common point Q in G 1 . Let A and B be two entities in the networks who are going to agree to some session keys. They can perform the following protocol: and the old session key K can be erased.
Protocol 2
We assume that all the members in the networks have a common point Q in G 1 . Let A and B be two entities in the networks who are going to agree to some session keys. They can perform the following protocol: 
Protocol 3
We assume that all the members in the networks have two common point Q, S in G 1 . When all the pairwise session keys have been constructed, the common secret Q, S can be erased. 
For user A, if the equation e(b′P,H(K) 2 P)=e(H(K)P,b′H(K)P)
is hold, he saves as the new session key between A and B. Similar verification can been done by user B. After A and B perform the update protocol, they get the session key K′= and the old session key K can be erased.
Performance and Security Analysis
We evaluate the proposed key agreement protocols in terms of communication, computation and security.
Performance
Assume that a group of users want to transfer massages in the network. To achieve security in the networks, it is important to be able to encrypt an authenticate massages sent among the users. In order to authenticate a user is the member of the group, a solution is to let all the members share a secret. Any pair of members can use this global secret to achieve key agreement and obtain a new pairwise key. Here, we suppose that the point in the group can be presented in 2l 1 computing an exponentiation in the group G 2 , and Enc the operation of computing encryption.
Security analysis
In the following, we briefly outline the attributes of our protocol: Passive attacks:
In protocol 1, if the adversary knows the massage transformed between two users A and B, i.e., he knows aP, bP, he cannot compute the secret session key K=e(P,Q) ab because he does not know the shared secret Q. Even if the adversary knows Q, he cannot get the K for he cannot obtain the secret number a chosen by A or b chosen by B. In the update phase, if the adversary knows the massage transformed between two users A and B, i.e., he knows a′P, b′P, he cannot compute the secret session key K′= , for he does not know a′, b′, and the shared session key K. 
H(a′P)a′H(K)P, H(b′P)b′H(K)P, he cannot compute the secret session key K′= e , for he
does not know a′, b′, and the shared session key K. 
Known-Key security:
If an adversary has obtained some session keys in the networks, it is still difficult for him to get the unknown session keys. For the users in the networks uniformly choose the points in the group, the session keys shared between different pairs are independent. If an adversary has obtained the current session key used between two users A and B in the networks, it is still difficult for him to get the previous session keys between A and B. After A and B perform the key update protocol, they get the new session key and erase the old session key. So, the adversary cannot get the previous session in a direct way. Although he knows the relationship between the new session key and the old session key, he cannot get : Weil 913 the old session key through this relationship.
For example, in protocol 3, the new session key between A and B is K′= , where K is the old session key. If the adversary wants to compute K, he needs to solve the discrete logarithm and find an inverse image of the hash function. This is difficult for the adversary by our assumption.
Key-Compromise impersonation:
The compromise of one user's private session key does not imply that the private session keys of other users will also be compromised in our protocols. The adversary may impersonate the compromised user in the subsequent protocols since he knows the private session key of the compromised user, but he cannot impersonate other users.
For example, in protocol 2, if the adversary knows all the private session key belong to a user C, he cannot obtain the private session key shared between A and B. If the adversary wants to convince a user A in the networks that he shares a session key with the adversary, while in fact he shares the key with another user B, the adversary is required to know the common point shared by all the user at the beginning or the private session key of the user B. Otherwise, the attack hardly works.
For example, in protocol 3, if an adversary wants to share a session key with a user B, while B believes that he shares the session key with a user A, he needs to send B a message containing {aP,aQ}. Since the adversary does not know the point Q, he may guess a random point to construct the massage. When B receives the massage, he verifies whether e(aP,S)=e(Q,aQ) holds or not. Since Q is a random chosen point, this equation will hold with negligible probability. This attribute is still hold for key update phase because the adversary has no information about the previous session key shared between the user A and user B.
No key control:
In our protocols, the secret session key between any user A and user B is determined by both the user A and user B, and none of the two users can influence the outcome of the secret session key, or enforce the session key to fall into a pre-determined interval.
For example, in protocol 1, the session key between A and B is K=e(P,Q) ab , where a is chosen by user A and b is chosen by user B. Since user A does not know the value of secret number chosen by B, he cannot determine how to select the number a, such that the private session key is equal to the pre-determined value, or falls into a pre-determined interval.
Conclusion
The key agreement protocols result in shared secret session key between the users in the networks. In this paper, we propose three new key agreement protocols that emphasize their security and performance. The protocols use a common shared secret to authenticate that the user is the legal user in the networks, and the protocols have the security attributes such as known session key security, perfect forward secrecy, no key-compromise impersonation, no unknown key-share and no key control.
